OPINION
Nepal’s peace dilemma
Failure to conclude the TJ process undercuts achievements in the structural transformation of Nepal.
- KHIM LAL DEVKOTA
On November 21, 2006, the Compre-hensive Peace Accord (CPA) was signed between the Government of Nepal (GoN) and the then Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), officially bringing an end to the decade-long armed conflict. This document facilitated Nepal’s transition from war to peace, ending the Maoist insurgency that had started a decade earlier. As per the Nepal Conflict Report published by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2012, over 13,000 persons were killed in the insurgency, 1,300 went missing, and numerous others were displaced, mutilated, tortured and sexually exploited.
Path to peace
The CPA included various provisions aimed at promoting stability and reconciliation in the post-conflict period. Both sides were required to make public the status of the people in their custody and release them within 15 days. Additionally, they were obligated to disclose, within 60 days, information about the real name, caste and address of individuals who were ‘disappeared’ or killed during the war and inform their families. The agreement also mandated the formation of a ‘National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission’ to establish peace in society by normalising adverse situations generated by armed conflict, providing relief and rehabilitation for people victimised and displaced by war, and carrying forward related tasks through the commission. Furthermore, it was agreed to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to investigate the truth about individuals seriously violating human rights and involved in crimes against humanity, creating an environment of reconciliation in society.
Article 33 of the Interim Constitution, 2007 addressed the CPA and contained mandates for relief, recognition, and rehabilitation for families of the deceased and individuals disabled during the armed conflict. It required providing relief to victims’ families based on the report of the Investigation Commission, which will investigate cases of enforced disappearance during the conflict. The constitution emphasised the need for special programs to rehabilitate displaced persons, offer compensation for damaged property, and rebuild infrastructure. Additionally, it called for the establishment of a high-level ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ to investigate individuals involved in serious violations of human rights and crimes against humanity during the conflict to foster an atmosphere of reconciliation in society.
Accordingly, the Government of Nepal submitted the Bill on Disappearances Act, 2066, and the Bill on Forming the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, 2066, to the legislature-parliament of the then Constituent Assembly. However, after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, those bills automatically became inactive.
Seeking truth
It is crucial to acknowledge the intricacies involved in drafting the constitution by the then Constituent Assembly. The political parties faced challenges in reaching a consensus, particularly on the restructuring of the state. The peace agreement also underscored the importance of addressing state restructuring. During that period, the integration of Maoist fighters into the Nepal Army was also a significant issue. With considerable effort, 1,460 out of the 19,600 Maoist fighters were successfully integrated into the Nepal Army. This accomplishment marked a significant milestone in the peace process deal.
The Enforced Disappearances Inquiry, Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, 2071 (“TRC Act 2014”) was promulgated in May 2014. Subsequently, two separate commissions, namely the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Commission of Investigation on Enforced Disappeared Persons (CIEDP), were established in February 2015. The commissions did some work: A total of 3,288 complaints have been registered, with 2,543 currently awaiting investigation. Moreover, 3,993 family members of 1,321 disappeared persons have received victim identification cards. The CIEDP has recommended that the government provide relief to the families of 551 missing persons who have not yet received assistance.
As for the TRC, 63,718 complaints have been registered, covering issues such as physical and mental torture, property damage, murder, displacement, injury, kidnapping, rape and sexual violence. Only about 4,000 complaints have undergone preliminary investigation. Due to the Supreme Court’s verdicts, disputes among political parties, and repeated time extensions, the commissions have struggled to function effectively and have remained vacant since July 2022.
In numerous cases, the Supreme Court has ruled on issues such as the assertion that pardons cannot be granted in serious crimes without the consent of the victim, highlighting various serious human rights violations. It has also emphasised that the existing law is not victim-friendly. The court has said cases from the conflict era should not be prolonged any further. As the peace process unfolds, the international community is closely monitoring Nepal’s transitional justice. Further, many human rights activists have also suggested that the four pillars of transitional justice—truth, justice, reparation, and the guarantee of non-recurrence of conflict, as identified by the United Nations, should be considered a foundation.
Based on the court’s verdicts, among others, the government registered a bill to amend the TRC Act 2014 in the Parliament Secretariat in March 2023. The bill is under discussion in the Law, Justice, and Human Rights Committee committee of the House of Representatives. Despite a sub-panel’s attempt to streamline amendments and find common ground, it submitted an incomplete report in October 2023 due to a lack of consensus. Lawmakers couldn’t agree on categorising killings, leading to ongoing debate. Conflict victims advocate for labelling various types of killings as serious human rights violations, including extrajudicial and unlawful acts. The committee remains undecided on the course of action if victims reject reconciliation.
Justice delayed
Among the four pillars of the peace process, the integration of Maoist combatants into the Nepal Army, state restructuring, and the promulgation of a new constitution have been accomplished. However, transitional justice has remained unresolved for the past 17 years. All parties involved in the conflict must acknowledge the truth regarding the violations committed. Undoubtedly, the victims and their families have the right to voice their concerns and receive appropriate answers to their questions. Seventeen years since the CPA, the task of investigating human rights violations since 1996, revealing the truth, disseminating the reality, delivering justice and assistance to victims, and fostering social reconciliation and enduring peace remains unfulfilled.
The peace process has yet to reach a logical conclusion, presenting a significant challenge. Nevertheless, notable changes have occurred: The previously centralised governance system has been constitutionally decentralised, integrating backward and marginalised communities such as women, Dalits, Madhesi, and Muslims into the mainstream; political stability has been achieved, demonstrated by two consecutive elections and the restructuring of the governance system; the empowerment of people and the assertion of their sovereign rights are evident, accompanied by the effective distribution of fiscal and human resources to their doorsteps.
It is crucial to interpret these positive developments in connection with the CPA. However, political parties must be sincere in bringing the peace process to a logical conclusion. It should not be perceived as a means of seizing power but rather as a pathway toward genuine resolution.
OPINION
Democracy wearing an army uniform
Concerns about the fairness and transparency of the electoral process are mounting in Pakistan.
- AJAY DARSHAN BEHERA
As Pakistan gears up for its general elections on February 8, the fate of the country’s democracy hangs in the balance. Concerns about the fairness and transparency of the electoral process are mounting.
The rejection of the nomination papers of most candidates of the Pakistan Tehreeq-e-Insaf party (PTI) and some other parties has sparked debates about the legitimacy of the polls. There are worries about the overall fairness and legality of the electoral process, heightening Pakistan’s challenges to political stability.
Achieving political stability is paramount to addressing numerous challenges, including a weak economy, soaring inflation and escalating foreign debt. Pakistan does not have a good track record of free and fair elections. For almost 34 years, the country has been under direct military rule. When not in power, the military has resorted to political engineering to manipulate poll outcomes or dismissed governments that were not to its liking.
The military propelled the PTI to power in 2018, creating a leader in Imran Khan, who lacked prior governance experience. Imran’s political rise and downfall have been remarkable. The PTI, barely visible on the political scene in 2008, made substantial gains by securing 17 percent of the popular vote in 2013, increasing it to 32 percent in 2018. However, this may not necessarily be the strength of the PTI’s support base, as the elections in 2018 were rigged in its favour. The 2018 elections were Pakistan’s second successful democratic transition—one political party handing over power to another without being dismissed. It possibly portends the future of electoral democracy in Pakistan—a political system in which the military will not derail democracy but will simply “guide” it.
Imran claimed he and the military were on the same page early in his tenure. However, differences with the Army arose over choosing the successor to the then Director General of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Lt. Gen. Faiz Hameed. The Army Chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, also distanced himself from Imran’s anti-US stance. The economic mismanagement under Imran’s government was also an issue. Pakistan’s GDP fell from $315 billion in 2018 to $292 billion in 2022. Imran’s politics did not gel with the military.
His government was ousted from power in a no-confidence motion in April 2022. His removal, Imran believed, was due to a foreign conspiracy (read, US). Urging his supporters to engage in peaceful protests, he garnered significant traction with his anti-establishment and anti-American narrative. The PTI has been a disruptive force in Pakistani politics for some years now. The zenith of the party’s disruptive politics unfolded on May 9, 2023, marked by attacks on military installations and public property, shortly after Imran’s arrest by the security forces. Since then, the military has made a systematic effort to break and weaken Imran’s party.
Imran is currently incarcerated, and attempts to marginalise the PTI have given rise to splinter parties like Jahangir Tareen’s Istehkam-e-Pakistan Party and Pervez Khattak’s PTI (Parliamentarians).
The party has been deprived of its “cricket bat” election symbol on the grounds that its intra-party polls were unconstitutional, bringing into question the impartiality of Pakistan’s Election Commission. Party members have been intimidated and faced obstacles in filing nomination papers, and the police have targeted their families. The way the military has gone after Imran and dismantled the PTI, it is clear that it will never allow him to return to power.
In 2018, Imran was the flavour of the electoral season. Ironically, in 2024, it is his bete noir, Nawaz Sharif of PML (N). In the 2018 elections, the military did not want Nawaz Sharif back in power and did its best to weaken the PML (N). Ironically, in 2024, it does not wish Imran Khan to return to power but wants Sharif instead. The Pakistan military does not want a genuinely popular civilian political leader in power backed by an electoral mandate.
It also wants a civilian government that would protect the core interests of the military in policy-making. The military would no longer like to be burdened with the responsibilities of power. Instead, it prefers a “guided democracy”—a formal democratic structure maintained and legitimised through elections.
This façade of democracy shrouds the actual role and power of the military as an institution in the civil-military equation. Imran had to be jettisoned because he began to undermine the arrangement with the army that had catapulted him to power. Now, with Imran contained and the probability of his returning to power being almost non-existent, the PML (N) leadership is actively working on building a future ruling coalition. However, the party lacks a concrete programme to address Pakistan’s significant challenges. The PML(N) appears to be stuck in the past, with the list of probable candidates dominated by old faces, particularly from the Sharif family.
The performance of the Pakistan Democratic Movement under the prime ministership of Nawaz Sharif’s brother, Shehbaz Sharif, was lacklustre. It raises questions about what the PML (N) has to offer to deal with Pakistan’s economic and security challenges that would be new.
Therefore, the prospect of these elections bringing about political stability and tackling the fragile economic situation remains uncertain. Pakistan faces formidable economic challenges, having narrowly averted default in 2023. Managing debt servicing poses a significant challenge, with projected figures reaching $25 billion for the financial year 2024-25 and $23 billion for 2025-26.
While external borrowings offer temporary relief, lasting stability necessitates structural reforms, including fiscal responsibility and a reduced dependence on external aid. Whether a “selected government” will have the freedom and autonomy to tackle these challenges, bring about political stability, and improve democratic governance in Pakistan remains to be seen.
Behera is a professor at MMAJ Academy of International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India.
— 360info
OUR VIEW
The electric future
There is a need for more clarity on policy and intent on switching to electric vehicles.
Electric vehicles (EVs) have taken the world by storm, and Nepal is no exception to this trend. According to the Department of Customs, in the first half of 2023-24, the country’s shift to EVs reached a record high, accounting for a third of auto import value. Thanks to their cost effectiveness and environment friendliness, even those who rely on petrol or diesel vehicles are now turning to EVs. Financial institutions are also supporting the EV trend, providing loans of up to 90 percent of the total cost of the vehicle.
Nepal, in its zero-emission strategy of the second Nationally Determined Goals, aims to ramp up EV sales to 90 percent of all four- and two-wheeler private vehicles and 60 percent of all four-wheeler public vehicle sales by 2030, which is a positive step. However, the country still intends to build two new petroleum pipelines beginning this fiscal year. This goes against Nepal’s commitment to achieving net zero emissions and belies the country’s plan for an environmentally friendly transport system.
According to Statistica’s 2022 report on transport emissions worldwide, the sector’s share of yearly carbon dioxide emissions is more than 7 billion metric tonnes. EVs indeed help cut emissions as they produce fewer greenhouse gases than fossil fuel vehicles, promising a green future. Given this and rising climate change tensions, EVs have become more crucial than ever. But are our policymakers, investors and stakeholders also aware of the downsides of EVs?
Research and studies show that EV batteries contain raw materials like lithium, cobalt and nickel, which have short life spans. Research by Greenpeace East Asia, an organisation working on the green movement, suggests that globally, over 12 metric tonnes of lithium-ion batteries are expected to stop working between 2021 and 2030. Additionally, when these batteries expire, they remain in the environment as electric waste. There are also environmental concerns over recharging EVs using non-renewable energy sources like coal power stations rather than with renewable sources.
While experts and researchers in developed countries are prioritising repurposing and recycling EV batteries, that is still a distant concern for Nepal. We are still struggling to build sufficient charging stations for EVs and are only taking baby steps by formulating policies on net zero emissions. On the one hand, the government encourages people to use EVs by levying high taxes on fossil fuel vehicles; on the other, it keeps investing in fuel pipelines to make petroleum products cheaper and more accessible. Given this muddled thinking, there is thus a risk that Nepal could re-embrace fossil fuel vehicles. In this case, policymakers must first be clear about what is in the best interest of the public and the environment. This calls for a profound revision of their plans without compromising the importance of EVs.
Developed countries are trying to recycle and repurpose batteries to tackle the challenges posed by batteries. For instance, China has been using retired lithium-ion batteries for 5G infrastructure, data centres and energy storage. The Greenpeace research estimates that by 2025, repurposed batteries could power all of China’s 5G telecom stations. Nepal could try to emulate this. More immediately, there is a need for clarity on policy and intent on the embrace of the EVs. For instance, fretting over losing tax revenues from petrol vehicles, as some of our policymakers are doing, is worrying about the wrong thing at the wrong time.
THEIR VIEW
Wheat woes
A strategy encompassing climate-resilient agricultural practices and farmer support is imperative.
As the country faces the spectre of above-normal temperatures in its key wheat-producing regions, the nation’s agricultural landscape is poised at a critical juncture. The heat forecast for February sparks concerns about the impending impact on crop yields, a worry that echoes the challenging weather conditions experienced in previous years, leading to a sharp decline in state reserves. The vulnerability of India’s wheat production to adverse weather conditions is not a novel predicament.
The nation, the world’s second-largest wheat producer after China, grapples with a delicate balance between ensuring food security for its 1.4 billion people and the political ramifications of potential imports. The looming question revolves around whether the Centre should yield to the pressing need for wheat imports, a move that might be necessary to avert a severe shortage and skyrocketing prices.
However, the timing couldn’t be more sensitive, with a general election on the horizon. The reluctance to import wheat stems from the fear of unsettling farmers, a crucial constituency that plays a pivotal role in shaping electoral outcomes. The repercussions of a third consecutive poor wheat harvest are tangible. The past two years have witnessed hot and unseasonably warm weather, which took a toll on wheat output, leading to inventories dwindling to their lowest levels in seven years. Prices soared far above the government-set minimum support price, exacerbating concerns about affordability and access to this staple for millions. India’s northern states, including Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and the central state of Madhya Pradesh, are the epicentre of wheat cultivation. These regions are bracing for above-normal temperatures during a crucial stage of wheat growth, raising fears of potential crop damage. Wheat, being a winter crop, is particularly susceptible to dry conditions, and a rise in temperatures during the grain formation stage could spell trouble for yields. In 2023, India experienced a significant dip in wheat harvest, at least 10 percent lower than the Centre’s estimate. A prolonged cold spell initially favoured wheat during its vegetative growth, only to be offset by rising temperatures later in the season. The result was a stark reminder of the fragility of agricultural production in the face of climatic unpredictability.
The narrative underscores the need for a nuanced and comprehensive approach to tackle India’s wheat challenges. While the immediate concern is securing a robust wheat supply to meet domestic demand, a broader strategy encompassing climate-resilient agricultural practices, research and development, and farmer support systems is imperative. As the Centre contemplates the delicate decision of whether to import wheat, a forward-looking perspective is essential.
Embracing sustainable agricultural practices, investing in technology to mitigate climate risks, and providing farmers with the necessary tools and knowledge can pave the way for a more resilient agricultural sector. At the same time, a concerted effort must be made to promote the use of other staples. The delicate balance between addressing the immediate crisis and implementing proactive measures will shape the future trajectory of India’s agricultural landscape.
— The Statesman (India)/ANN